Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Executive SummaryThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Technical ReportThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control Agreements between three Peer Adversaries

NPS NRP Executive SummaryThis research will investigate the implications of China as a peer nuclear armed adversary and how this effects US deterrence strategy that has traditionally been concerned with bilateral deterrence between the USA and Russia. The introduction of a third peer nuclear armed nation adds significant complexity and dynamics that were not present before. China has not been party to previous nuclear arms control agreements and they have been developing their nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any other nation. However, they have committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and a policy of no first use. It is vital to understand what motivates Chinese leadership, and what would cause them to voluntarily engage in arms control agreements with the purpose of adding stability to nuclear deterrence between the three nations. This research will help understand these issues, as well as offer recommendations to modify US nuclear deterrence to better deter and stabilize deterrence between the US and China while maintaining effective deterrence between the US and Russia. Also, the power dynamics between China and Russia must also be understood to help implement policies to support, and avoid mistakes that could undermine, deterrence between them.N3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Project PosterThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control Agreements between three Peer Adversaries

NPS NRP Project PosterThis research will investigate the implications of China as a peer nuclear armed adversary and how this effects US deterrence strategy that has traditionally been concerned with bilateral deterrence between the USA and Russia. The introduction of a third peer nuclear armed nation adds significant complexity and dynamics that were not present before. China has not been party to previous nuclear arms control agreements and they have been developing their nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any other nation. However, they have committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and a policy of no first use. It is vital to understand what motivates Chinese leadership, and what would cause them to voluntarily engage in arms control agreements with the purpose of adding stability to nuclear deterrence between the three nations. This research will help understand these issues, as well as offer recommendations to modify US nuclear deterrence to better deter and stabilize deterrence between the US and China while maintaining effective deterrence between the US and Russia. Also, the power dynamics between China and Russia must also be understood to help implement policies to support, and avoid mistakes that could undermine, deterrence between them.N3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control Agreements between three Peer Adversaries

NPS NRP Technical ReportThis research will investigate the implications of China as a peer nuclear armed adversary and how this effects US deterrence strategy that has traditionally been concerned with bilateral deterrence between the USA and Russia. The introduction of a third peer nuclear armed nation adds significant complexity and dynamics that were not present before. China has not been party to previous nuclear arms control agreements and they have been developing their nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any other nation. However, they have committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and a policy of no first use. It is vital to understand what motivates Chinese leadership, and what would cause them to voluntarily engage in arms control agreements with the purpose of adding stability to nuclear deterrence between the three nations. This research will help understand these issues, as well as offer recommendations to modify US nuclear deterrence to better deter and stabilize deterrence between the US and China while maintaining effective deterrence between the US and Russia. Also, the power dynamics between China and Russia must also be understood to help implement policies to support, and avoid mistakes that could undermine, deterrence between them.N3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

A miniaturized 4 K platform for superconducting infrared photon counting detectors

We report on a miniaturized platform for superconducting infrared photon counting detectors. We have implemented a fibre-coupled superconducting nanowire single photon detector in a Stirling/Joule–Thomson platform with a base temperature of 4.2 K. We have verified a cooling power of 4 mW at 4.7 K. We report 20% system detection efficiency at 1310 nm wavelength at a dark count rate of 1 kHz. We have carried out compelling application demonstrations in single photon depth metrology and singlet oxygen luminescence detection

Same-day diagnostic and surveillance data for tuberculosis via whole genome sequencing of direct respiratory samples

Routine full characterization of Mycobacterium tuberculosis (TB) is culture-based, taking many weeks. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) can generate antibiotic susceptibility profiles to inform treatment, augmented with strain information for global surveillance; such data could be transformative if provided at or near point of care. We demonstrate a low-cost DNA extraction method for TB WGS direct from patient samples. We initially evaluated the method using the Illumina MiSeq sequencer (40 smear-positive respiratory samples, obtained after routine clinical testing, and 27 matched liquid cultures). M. tuberculosis was identified in all 39 samples from which DNA was successfully extracted. Sufficient data for antibiotic susceptibility prediction was obtained from 24 (62%) samples; all results were concordant with reference laboratory phenotypes. Phylogenetic placement was concordant between direct and cultured samples. Using an 70 Illumina MiSeq/MiniSeq the workflow from patient sample to results can be completed in 44/16 hours at a reagent cost of £96/£198 per sample. We then employed a non-specific PCR-based library preparation method for sequencing on an Oxford Nanopore Technologies MinION sequencer. We applied this to cultured Mycobacterium bovis BCG strain (BCG), and to combined culture negative sputum DNA and BCG DNA. For flowcell version R9.4, the estimated turnaround time from patient to identification of BCG, detection of pyrazinamide resistance, and phylogenetic placement was 7.5 hours, with full susceptibility results 5 hours later. Antibiotic susceptibility predictions were fully concordant. A critical advantage of the MinION is the ability to continue sequencing until sufficient coverage is obtained, providing a potential solution to the problem of variable amounts of M. tuberculosis in direct samples

Relationship between microbiology of throat swab and clinical course among primary care patients with acute cough: a prospective cohort study.

BACKGROUND: Acute lower respiratory tract infections (ALRTIs) account for most antibiotics prescribed in primary care despite lack of efficacy, partly due to clinician uncertainty about aetiology and patient concerns about illness course. Nucleic acid amplification tests could assist antibiotic targeting. METHODS: In this prospective cohort study, 645 patients presenting to primary care with acute cough and suspected ALRTI, provided throat swabs at baseline. These were tested for respiratory pathogens by real-time polymerase chain reaction and classified as having a respiratory virus, bacteria, both or neither. Three hundred fifty-four participants scored the symptoms severity daily for 1 week in a diary (0 = absent to 4 = severe problem). RESULTS: Organisms were identified in 346/645 (53.6%) participants. There were differences in the prevalence of seven symptoms between the organism groups at baseline. Those with a virus alone, and those with both virus and bacteria, had higher average severity scores of all symptoms combined during the week of follow-up than those in whom no organisms were detected [adjusted mean differences 0.204 (95% confidence interval 0.010 to 0.398) and 0.348 (0.098 to 0.598), respectively]. There were no differences in the duration of symptoms rated as moderate or severe between organism groups. CONCLUSIONS: Differences in presenting symptoms and symptoms severity can be identified between patients with viruses and bacteria identified on throat swabs. The magnitude of these differences is unlikely to influence management. Most patients had mild symptoms at 7 days regardless of aetiology, which could inform patients about likely symptom duration